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Improved Security and Reliability in the DNS Provider Discovery Mechanism of Domain 
Connect Protocol  
ABSTRACT 
Domain Connect is a publicly available standard that enables DNS Providers to provide a 
mechanism for Service Providers to place DNS records on the domain, thus freeing the customer 
from having to manually set the records. There however exist some security and reliability 
challenges arising from the current Domain Connect specifications which Service Providers 
might want to protect themselves from. Specifically the _domainconnect TXT record, in theory, 
can be compromised to point to a server controlled by a bad actor; the protocol does not provide 
a facility to shut down DNS Providers known to have downtime or other issues; and the 
specification also doesn’t enforce URL fields from the settings call to be on the HTTPS scheme. 
This disclosure describes an allow-list mechanism that mitigates the above-described security 
and reliability challenges. A wildcard (or regular-expression) check is conducted on the initial 
server URL returned from following the _domainconnect TXT record for a given domain, e.g., to 
check the host name in the URL, etc. Subsequent wildcard checks also validate fields that are 
returned in response to the settings call.  
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BACKGROUND 
An internet domain name, e.g. example.com, makes it easy for customers to access 
websites without having to memorize and enter numeric IP addresses for those websites. 
Customers, such as individuals and businesses, purchase domain names from domain registrars. 
The domain name system (DNS) is the phonebook of the internet, mapping domain names to 
their IP addresses by looking up DNS records maintained at name servers. A customer can hire 
one or more Service Providers to provide various services, e.g. email, documents storage, word 
processing, advertisement serving etc. on their domain. 
A DNS Provider (not to be confused with Service Provider) authoritatively hosts the 
DNS records such as A, NS, CNAME, MX, TXT etc. [1]. For example, the A record stores the 
actual IP address associated with the domain. The NS record shows the nameservers currently 
used by the domain. The CNAME record is a type of resource record in the Domain Name 
System (DNS) that maps one domain name to another (the canonical name). MX refers to mail 
servers used by the domain. A TXT record (short for text record) is a type of resource record in 
the Domain name System (DNS) used to provide the ability to associate arbitrary text with a host 
or other name, such as human readable information. 
Domain Connect is a standard that enables DNS Providers to provide a mechanism for 
Service Providers to place DNS records on the domain, thus freeing the customer from having to 
manually set the records [2]. The Service Provider might typically use heuristics or rules to guess 
the DNS Provider for the domain they serve. The Domain Connect specification also enables the 
Service Provider to discover the DNS Provider for a domain automatically by following the 
public TXT record on the _domainconnect subdomain to get the address of a settings server. The 
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Service Provider can then fetch the settings of the DNS Provider for the domain using an HTTP 
REST API call. The settings have a number of fields in the form of a JSON object e.g. 
{ 
"providerId": "xyzdomains.com", 
"providerName": "XYZ Domains", 











Fig. 1: Synchronous flow with DNS Provider discovery 
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Fig. 1 illustrates an example workflow (known as synchronous flow) of DNS Provider 
discovery by a Service Provider using the Domain Connect specification. Upon a customer 
requesting a domain registration, the registrar provisions the domain and the nameservers. The 
nameservers point to the DNS Provider. The customer signs up for services with the Service 
Provider. The Service Provider enables services for the customer by requesting them for 
permission to apply a Domain Connect template to update or add to the DNS records. The 
customer authenticates themselves on the DNS Provider website and authorizes the Service 
Provider to apply the Domain Connect template. Once the DNS records are added or updated 
successfully, the Service Provider can provide services to the customer. 
PROBLEMS 
This works in the general case but there are certain challenges pertaining to security and 
reliability which Service Providers might want to protect themselves from. These include: 
● Problem 1: The _domainconnect TXT record can be compromised to point to a bad actor's 
server. Subsequent settings call on the URL returned from _domainconnect record can then 
also be compromised in such cases. As per the specification, the URL in the urlSyncUX 
parameter from settings response is actually expected to load the DNS Provider’s user 
interface (UI). A bad actor however can use this to show an arbitrary UI to the Service 
Provider's customers. 
● Problem 2: The protocol doesn't provide a mechanism to shut down DNS Providers by 
Service Providers where DNS Providers are known to have downtime or other issues. 
● Problem 3: The specification doesn't enforce or recommend URL scheme validation from 
the settings call response e.g. checks to enforce URL fields e.g. urlSyncUX, urlAsyncUX, 
urlApi, urlControlPanel etc. are hosted on the HTTPS scheme. 
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Each of these lead to specific scenarios, described in detail below with examples. 
Problem 1: Compromising DNS Provider discovery using a corrupted TXT record 
 
Fig. 2: Compromising DNS Provider discovery using a corrupted TXT record 
Fig. 2 illustrates an example attack mode, e.g. when a bad actor corrupts the 
_domainconnect record on the domain to compromise DNS Provider discovery settings 
requested by a Service Provider. In such a case, as illustrated, the bad actor can gain the login 
credentials of the customer etc. with the potential to cause substantial harm.  
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Example: An example is provided below that illustrates this problem: 
1. Assume that the domain of the customer is “mydomain.com” 
2. Assume that the _domainconnect record has been compromised to contain the hostname 
“api.badactor.com”, unknown to the customer. 
3. A Service Provider providing services to “mydomain.com” would query the 
_domainconnect record in point 2 to get “api.badactor.com” 
4. The Service Provider would then proceed to make a settings call for mydomain.com by 
calling the URL https://api.badactor.com/v2/mydomain.com/settings 
5. This would then contain bad URLs for integrating with Domain connect like so 
{ 
"providerId": "badactor.com", 
"providerName": "Bad actor", 







"nameServers": ["ns01.badactor.com", "ns02.badactor.com"] 
} 
6. When the Service Provider redirects to any of the URLs as part of the Domain Connect 
protocol - the customer is now being redirected to bad actor’s URLs where they can 
suffer loss of login credentials or PII or other possible attacks. 
 
It is true that the customer’s domain is already in a compromised state at the beginning of the 
flow. But these URLs might compromise aspects of the customer not yet compromised. 
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Problem 2: An unknown DNS Provider or a DNS Provider suffering an outage/downtime 
 
Fig. 3: A DNS Provider suffering an outage / downtime 
Fig. 3 illustrates an example of how a DNS Provider going through downtime / service 
outage can result in an unreliable experience for the Service Provider. The specification currently 
has no recommendation for these scenarios. Furthermore, Service Providers might not want to 
integrate with DNS Providers unknown to them for reliability or business reasons, while still 
leveraging the benefits of the Domain Connect DNS Provider discovery specification. 
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Example: An example is provided below that illustrates this problem: 
1. Assume that the domain of the customer is “mydomain.com” 
2. Assume that the _domainconnect record correctly points to the good DNS Provider 
“MyAwesomeDNSProvider” with the URL “api.myawesomednsprovider.com 
3. A Service Provider providing services to “mydomain.com” would query the 
_domainconnect record in point 2 to get “api.myawesomednsprovider.com” 
4. The Service Provider would then proceed to make a settings call for mydomain.com by 
calling the URL https://api.myawesomednsprovider.com/v2/mydomain.com/settings 















6. However assume that MyAwesomeDNSProvider is having a known outage which the 
Service Provider might want to guard against 
7. Since there is no good way to detect MyAwesomeDNSProvider as per the current 
specification, they would continue to integrate with the MyAwesomeDNSProvider and 
the customer would see a failure on the UI, which could have been avoided. 
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Problem 3: DNS Provider uses HTTP instead of HTTPS URLs in settings 
 
Fig. 4: Illustration of an existing security issue if the DNS Provider uses HTTP URLs as 
opposed to HTTPS 
Fig. 4 illustrates an existing security issue in the traditional synchronous flow that arises 
if the DNS Provider uses the HTTP protocol instead of the HTTPS protocol. The use of the less 
secure HTTP protocol leaves open the possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack which eventually 
will compromise the overall flow for the user. 
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Example: An example is provided below that illustrates this problem: 
1. Assume that the domain of the customer is “mydomain.com” 
2. Assume that the _domainconnect record contains the hostname 
“api.gooddnsprovider.com” for “mydomain.com” 
3. A Service Provider providing services to “mydomain.com” would query the 
_domainconnect record in point 2 to get “api.gooddnsprovider.com” 
4. The Service Provider would then proceed to make a settings call for “mydomain.com” by 
calling the URL https://api.gooddnsprovider.com/v2/mydomain.com/settings 
5. This response might look like this 
{ 
"providerId": “gooddnsproviderid”, 
"providerName": "gooddnsprovider name", 








"nameServers": ["ns01.gooddnsprovider.com", "ns02.gooddnsprovider.com"] 
} 
 
6. As shown in the above response, all the URLs returned are using HTTP scheme instead 
of HTTPS. Now when a Service Provider initiates any call e.g. an apply template call 
using one of the above URLs, the outgoing call will be insecure as it is hosted on HTTP 
scheme instead of HTTPS and thus is prone to man-in-the-middle attack which eventually 
will compromise the overall flow for the user. 
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SOLUTION 
This disclosure describes an allow-list mechanism that mitigates the above described 
security and reliability challenges. A wildcard (or regular-expression) check is conducted on the 
initial URL returned from following the _domainconnect TXT record. Subsequent wildcard 
checks also verify the fields such as: providerId, providerName, providerDisplayName, 
urlSyncUX, urlAsyncUX, urlApi, urlControlPanel etc. which are returned in response to the 
settings call. The URLs are additionally verified to be HTTPS, not HTTP. 
These checks can be achieved in the following two steps: 
1. Getting the pattern for each of the above parameters from the DNS Providers in advance. 
The pattern type can be one of the pattern types SUBSTRING, STARTSWITH, 
ENDSWITH, EXACT or any other regular expression based construct. 
2. Validating each of these patterns against actual fields which are returned in response to 
the real time settings JSON call. 
A DNS Provider is considered secure only if each of the above checks pass. Furthermore, 
if a DNS Provider is identified as failing, default fallbacks can be agreed upon with the DNS 
Provider, thereby mitigating the reliability related challenges. Such fallbacks can be e.g. URLs 
for the settings urlSyncUX, urlAsyncUX, urlApi, urlControlPanel etc. Or in other cases, the 
Service Provider can turn down traffic to the DNS provider which is suffering any outage or any 
other issue. 
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Solution for problem 1: Hardening against a compromised _domainconnect record 
 
Fig. 5: Hardening against a compromised _domainconnect record 
 Fig. 5 illustrates hardening against a compromised _domainconnect record, per the 
techniques of this disclosure. In contrast to Fig. 2, a Service Provider can detect, using the 
described techniques, a compromised _domainconnect record and immediately end the flow, 
shunting out the bad actor.  
Example: An example is provided below that illustrates the solution. 
1. Assume that the domain of the customer is “mydomain.com” 
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2. Assume that the _domainconnect record has been compromised to contain the hostname 
“api.badactor.com”, unknown to the customer. 
3. A Service Provider providing services to “mydomain.com” would query the 
_domainconnect record in point 2 to get “api.badactor.com” 
4. However, at this very point, the Service Provider would check this URL retrieved against 
known wildcard patterns of all known good DNS Providers they wish to integrate with 
e.g. consider the following database on the Service Provider side created with agreement 
with DNS Providers. 
DNS Provider Settings URL pattern Settings URL pattern type 
MyAwesomeDNS “myawesomedns.com” SUBSTRING 
MyAwesomeDNS2 “api.myawesomedns2.com” EXACT 
 
5. At this point - the Service Provider checks the retrieved settings API server i.e. 
api.badactor.com against both providers it has chosen to integrate with 
a. MyAwesomeDNS’s pattern translates to the pattern “*myawesomedns.com*” - 
which the retrieved URL doesn’t match against 
b. MyAwesomeDNS2’s pattern is an exact match against “api.myawesomedns2.com” 
the retrieved URL also doesn’t match against. 
6. The Service Provider decides therefore to reject this settings URL and the customer is 
therefore protected. While such rejection may result in blocking some good DNS 
providers, it ensures that integrating with bad DNS providers is eliminated. This tradeoff 
may be preferable than the high costs of integrating with a bad provider. 
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Solution for problem 2: Hardening against DNS Providers suffering outage/downtime 
 
Fig. 6: Hardening against DNS Providers suffering outage/downtime 
Fig. 6 illustrates hardening against DNS Providers which are experiencing known 
downtime or suffering outages, per the techniques of this disclosure. In contrast to Fig. 3, the 
Service Provider can detect, using the described techniques, a blocked DNS Provider and 
immediately end the flow, thereby preventing existing reliability and security issues from 
compounding. 
Example: An example is provided below that illustrates the solution. 
1. Assume that the domain of the customer is “mydomain.com” 
2. Assume that the _domainconnect record correctly points to the good DNS Provider 
“MyAwesomeDNSProvider” with the URL “api.myawesomednsprovider.com 
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3. A Service Provider providing services to “mydomain.com” would query the 
_domainconnect record in point 2 to get “api.myawesomednsprovider.com” 
4. The Service Provider would then proceed to make a settings call for mydomain.com by 
calling the URL https://api.myawesomednsprovider.com/v2/mydomain.com/settings 















6. Now the Service Provider, in this proposed scheme would have already contained a list of 
wildcards for the various values in this settings call to enable them to detect the DNS 
Provider. For example, consider the below table of values on Service Provider side about 
DNS Provider: 













7. Now the Service Provider would match the returned settings call against the known 
information about providers - since the providerId for MyAwesomeDNSProvider is 
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“*myawesomednsprovider.com*” and the urlSyncUx is 
“*domainconnect.myawesomednsprovider.com” and both patterns match - the DNS 
Provider is correctly identified as MyAwesomeDNSProvider 
8. At this point, since the Service Provider would know which DNS Provider is involved - 
and any policy or engineering decision about this provider can now be applied, e.g., block 
it for the duration of the known downtime, outage etc. between the Service Provider and 
DNS Provider. 
9. Another policy decision which can be made is to fallback to settings URLs agreed upon 
between the Service Provider and the DNS Provider as mentioned earlier in this 
disclosure. 
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Solution for problem 3: Hardening against the use of HTTP URLs in settings 
 
Fig. 7: Hardening against the use of HTTP URLs in settings 
 Fig. 7 illustrates hardening against the use of HTTP URLs in settings. In contrast to Fig. 
4, the Service Provider can detect the use of the HTTP (rather than https) protocol and end the 
flow, thereby mitigating risk and preventing existing security issues from compounding.  
Example: An example is provided below that illustrates the solution. 
1. Assume that the domain of the customer is “mydomain.com” 
2. Assume that the _domainconnect record contains the hostname 
“api.gooddnsprovider.com” for “mydomain.com” 
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3. A Service Provider providing services to “mydomain.com” would query the 
_domainconnect record in point 2 to get “api.gooddnsprovider.com” 
4. The Service Provider would then proceed to make a settings call for “mydomain.com” by 
calling the URL https://api.gooddnsprovider.com/v2/mydomain.com/settings 
5. This response might look like this: 
{ 
"providerId": “gooddnsproviderid”, 
"providerName": "gooddnsprovider name", 








"nameServers": ["ns01.gooddnsprovider.com", "ns02.gooddnsprovider.com"] 
} 
 
6. However, at this very point the Service Provider would check the URLs retrieved in 
settings call response to ensure that URL follows the HTTPS scheme instead of HTTP. 
Since the URL scheme is HTTP the Service Provider will not make any subsequent calls- 
effectively thwarting any man-in-the-middle-attacks before such attacks even start. 
CONCLUSION 
This disclosure describes an allow-list mechanism that mitigates security and reliability 
related challenges arising from the current Domain Connect specification. A wildcard (or 
regular-expression) check is conducted on the initial server URL returned from following the 
_domainconnect TXT record for a given domain. Subsequent wildcard checks also validate 
fields that are returned in response to the settings call.  
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